Yes. There is a useful body of public evidence, although it is scattered across campus police reports, Clery Act disclosures, litigation, fire investigations and university facilities records.
For our IEEE E&H work, I would distinguish documented losses involving electronic access systems from incidents where electronic access might have prevented a loss but was not necessarily responsible.
The distinction matters for a code proposal. We need evidence of a failure mechanism, not merely evidence that an unfortunate event occurred.
I would examine four categories:
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Unauthorized building entry: Credential failures, propped doors, defective electronic locks and access-control outages.
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Emergency egress failures: Doors that failed to release, security systems that impeded evacuation or failures involving fire-alarm interfaces.
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Campus pathways and exterior spaces: Electrically operated gates, emergency call stations, lighting, surveillance and pedestrian access controls.
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Financial and operational losses: Theft, property damage, litigation, emergency repairs and business interruption attributable to access-control failures.
The Clery Act is especially relevant because it provides a recurring federal reporting framework for crimes on campuses and certain adjacent public properties. It does not, however, generally identify whether an electronic access system failed.
Documented cases — useful for an ICC/NFPA worksheet
I found several cases from 2024–2026 with unusually concrete evidence, including university investigations, public audit findings and operational outages.
| SES / Date |
Documented loss or deficiency |
Public record |
| Brown University, 2026 |
Emergency responders encountered inconsistent access-controlled doors and nonworking master keys. Forced entry caused property damage and may have delayed access to sheltering students. |
University investigation (PDF) |
| Lehigh University, March 2025 |
Campuswide electronic access outage after a system update. Staff manually unlocked academic and residential buildings while controllers were restored. |
Campus outage report |
| UNC–Chapel Hill, November 2024 |
Police alleged that a student cloned RFID credentials to enter restricted campus spaces, including residence halls and a fire equipment room. |
Police investigation coverage |
| Eastern Connecticut State University, 2026 |
State auditors found inadequate physical access controls around sensitive IT areas, including doors propped open by a contractor. |
State audit findings |
| Harvard University, 2024 |
A technical problem rendered the campus blue-light emergency phone network unavailable. |
Campus emergency phone investigation |
| University of Connecticut, 2026 |
Dispute over removal of emergency blue-light phones. University estimated $6 million to modernize the system and more than $70,000 annually for maintenance. |
University financial and operational statement |
The Brown case is especially important. Its investigation expressly states that access difficulties did not cause physical harm, but did cause property damage and potentially delayed some emergency responders. That is a documented operational consequence, not a speculative failure.
Two cases particularly close to our Michigan work
Michigan State University
Following the February 2023 shooting, MSU upgraded more than 700 classroom door locks and developed a $10 million security operations center overseeing approximately 5,400 electronic locks, 2,200 cameras and 551 motion detectors. Its architecture allows remote control of doors and elevators.
2025 security improvements report
University of Michigan
UM’s January 2025 project report describes a planned $30 million replacement program involving more than 10,000 locks across residence halls and apartments, including integration with existing credentials and university systems.
University project report
Michigan Technology Community News
These are not both examples of system failure. They establish the scale, cost and complexity of electronic access systems within educational settlements.
A particularly revealing exterior-campus issue
At American University, a 2023 student investigation documented eight malfunctioning blue-light emergency stations, including several with nonoperational emergency telephones. Some stations appeared functional from a distance despite being unavailable.
That raises a question about supervision and indication of failure: should a campus emergency communication device be permitted to appear operational when its essential function is unavailable?
It also connects directly to campus pathways, exterior lighting, emergency communication infrastructure and maintenance testing.
Implications for our standards agenda
I see three separate technical questions worth investigating:
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IBC Chapter 10: Are electronic door-control systems sufficiently resilient to power, communications and software failures, while maintaining required egress?
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NFPA 4: Should integrated testing explicitly examine cybersecurity-related outages, controller failures, emergency responder access and system restoration?
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Campus exterior infrastructure: Are emergency communications, electrically operated gates and access-controlled pathways adequately supervised and maintained?
We should not assume every campus pathway falls under IBC Chapter 10. Outdoor routes, public rights-of-way and accessible paths can fall under different codes and jurisdictional arrangements.
My recommendation for Tuesday: Lead with Brown University and Lehigh University as documented access-control consequences, then use the Michigan State and University of Michigan projects to establish scale. Include American University and UConn as a separate exterior-campus infrastructure discussion.
The next useful research step would be to extract actual loss amounts, repair costs, downtime, insurance claims and settlement amounts from public records. The cases above establish operational failures and expenditures, but they do not yet constitute a comprehensive actuarial loss dataset.
That distinction could become the foundation for a credible IEEE E&H technical paper as well as a carefully scoped ICC Group A proposal.